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Abstract This paper discusses the thesis that in Arrow’s Possibility Theorem the dictator
(merely) serves as a solution to the logical problem of aggregating preference while Machi-
avelli’s dictator, the Prince, has the historical function to bring order into a world of chaos and
thus make society ready for the implementation of a republican structure.
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1. From Arrow to Machiavelli and back again
The thesis of this paper is that in Arrow’s Possibility Theorem the dictator serves as a
solution to a logical problem while Machiavelli’s dictator, the Prince, has a historical
function. This function is bringing order to a society that is characterized by chaos.
As a consequence, Arrow’s dictator and Machiavelli’s Prince seem to be very differ-
ent concepts. However, there is a unifying dimension: the ‘one will.’ Therefore we
argue that by comparing these concepts we might gain a better understanding of what
dictators do and what they did and perhaps also why they did it.
While Machiavelli, at great pains, analyzed what circumstances and types of be-
haviour contributed to the success of the Prince, Arrow’s dictator is just a map of
individual preference ordering into a social one. However, in Arrow’s axiomatization,
‘non-dictatorship’ is a desired property of the map called social welfare function. To
Machiavelli’s Prince, efﬁciency and stability are objectives that do not only help him
to keep his power but also to gain him glory, the ﬁnal motive for all his striving. For
Arrow’s dictator an efﬁcient outcome is deﬁned by his own preferences and stability
is not an issue as he ‘lives’ in the timeless world of a static model. In technical terms,
Machiavelli is about an evolutionary process and mechanism design while Arrow is
about the deﬁciencies of a mechanism (i.e. voting) when it comes to the aggregation of
individual preferences into a (collective) social preference order.
In the next section we will give a critical interpretation of Arrow’s theorem, how-
ever trivial it seems to be, but also how insidious it is. Section 3 introduces Machi-
avelli’s principe nuovo, in short, the Prince. In Section 4 we follow the footprints of
the Prince that may lead from power to stability and efﬁciency. Section 5 discusses
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Machiavelli’s general theory with a focus on his cycle model of history.1 Section 6
concludes the paper with a reference to the ‘metaphysics’ in Arrow and Machiavelli. It
tries to clarify the ideological positions of the two authors and their motivation to write
what we discuss in this paper. While Machiavelli is rather explicit about his objectives,
Arrow’s Possibility Theorem looks as a highly abstract scientiﬁc work to most readers.
We hope to demonstrate its relevance for the interpretation of Machiavelli’s political
writing and the understanding of politics proper.
2. The Possibility Theorem
Machiavelli was a republican. However, he was quite aware that the aggregation of in-
dividual preferences to form a social preference order does not work if there is ‘chaos’,
and preferences are ‘unconstrained’ and suffer from intransitivity.2 More than 400
years later, Arrow (1963) showed that a social preference ordering, that is to satisfy
a few appealing properties, only exists if it is dictatorial, i.e., only if it is identical
with the preferences of an individual i, irrespective of what the preferences of the other
members of the society are, whether and how they change. A precondition is that the
preferences of the dictator i form a transitive, reﬂexive and complete ordering. “The
methods of dictatorship ... are, or can be, rational in the sense that any individual can
be rational in his choices.” (Arrow 1963, p. 2) However, one of the conditions of Arrow
is ‘non-dictatorship’ so inconsistency is straightforward.
Of course, this problem could be circumvented by dropping one of the other con-
ditions that should be satisﬁed by the social welfare function that deﬁnes the social
preference ordering: (i) ‘unrestricted domain’ which says that none of the possible pre-
ference proﬁles on the given set of alternatives should be excluded; (ii) ‘monotonicity’
which refers to Paretian efﬁciency3; (iii) ‘independence of irrelevant alternatives’, (iv)
‘citizen sovereignty’ which in Arrow’s words implies that the social welfare function is
not ‘imposed’, i.e., it derives from individual preferences. In this case, the social wel-
fare function is a ‘process or rule’ that maps the set of individual preferences proﬁles
into the set of social preference orderings, both deﬁned on the same sets of alterna-
tives. These alternatives are meant to describe social states. Obviously, voting rules
serve as ‘real-world’ social welfare function. However, inasmuch as, for example, sim-
ple majority voting merely determines a winner, and not a preference ordering on all
alternatives, it is a social choice function.
Arrow postulates that the social welfare function should satisfy the very same
axioms that deﬁne individual preference orderings: ‘connectivity’ and ‘transitivity’
where ‘connectivity’ implies both ‘completeness’ and ‘reﬂexivity’ which are standard
1 Sections 2 to 5 of this paper derive from Holler (2007, 2008, 2009).
2 Areviewerpointedoutthatthissentencesoundslikebluntanachronism. WehavetoadmitthatMachiavelli
could not have used this vocabulary, simply because he wrote in Italian and of course these concepts were
as yet not deﬁned. However, his thinking was more modern and much better structured than what followed.
See for instance the Anti-Machiavel by Frederick of Prussia (Of Prussia 1981 [1740]), written and published
with the ‘help’ of Voltaire.
3 “Since we are trying to describe social welfare and not some sort of illfare, we must assume that the social
welfare function is such that the social ordering responds positively to alterations in individual values.”
(Arrow 1963, p. 24)
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for the deﬁnition of an individual preference ordering. Now if the dictator i is rational
in the sense that his preferences, however deﬁned and applied, satisfy these axioms,
then i is an obvious solution to picking a social welfare function that satisﬁes condi-
tions (i) to (iv) and the axioms of ‘connectivity’ and ‘transitivity’. However, condition
(v), ‘non-dictatorship’ is violated.
It is interesting to see that Arrow’s proof of the General Possibility Theorem fo-
cuses on the dictator as a non-admitted and contradicting solution, and so did most
of the authors that reproduced variations of the proof in the sequel. This, of course,
sheds special light on the dictator. However, nothing is said about the conditions that
have to be satisﬁed to implement the dictator’s preferences. For instance, one might
argue that implementation is more costly, or presupposes more power, if the dictator’s
preferences differ considerably from the preferences found in the population.
Arrowwasnotconcernedaboutpowerandwill. Theimplicationofhisanalysiswas
that the aggregation of preferences in an idealized democratic world can be deﬁcient
and policy making cannot rely on a social welfare function that satisﬁes some nice
properties in the form of axioms and conditions. In real life, we have to look for other
ways to solve social choice problems. Of course, we have to note that nobody goes to
the barricades if the independence of irrelevant alternatives is violated and the social
ranking of the social states a and b depends on whether there is an alternative social
state c on the agenda or not. Such a result prevails, e.g., if a society relies on simple
majority voting and faces a Condorcet Paradox (i.e., the majority cycle).4 Moreover,
it is easy to show that standard voting procedures such as Borda count and approval
voting violate the independence condition.
Starting from this observation it may be concluded either to drop this independence
axiom or to take a more radical path and reject the ordinal utility project which is at
the heart of Arrow’s theory. With cardinal utilities and adequate rules of interpersonal
comparison of utility we avoid the problems of aggregation of preferences as genera-
lized in Arrow’s theorem. Hillinger (2005, p. 295) suggests ‘utilitarian voting’ which
allows a voter to ‘score each alternative with one of the scores permitted by a given
voting scale’. He ﬁnds that in ‘ordinal voting’ scores are unjustiﬁably restricted. This
of course is an interesting aspect because one of the conditions of Arrow’s theorem is
unrestricted domain. From Hillinger’s argument, however, follows that there is a (too)
strong restriction implicit to the choice of ordinal scales.5
In general, however, societies are less concerned about ordinality or cardinality
but more explicit in violating the unrestricted domain assumption, i.e., to restrict the
set of preference proﬁles that should be taken into account. A rather radical way to
restrict the domain is to exclude individuals and their preferences from the society that
is relevant for the aggregation problem. Minors can be viewed as an instance of such
4 Arrow (1963, p. 3) illustrates the problem of aggregating preferences by means of majority voting referring
to the ‘paradox of voting’. For a discussion of the original presentation of the problem by Marquis de
Condorcet and of E. J. Nanson’s elaboration, see Black (1963).
5 It is standard to relate the introduction of cardinality with independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA).
If preferences are ordinal it seems rather plausible that an alternative z has no impact on the ranking of the
alternatives x and y. However, there is ample empirical evidence that z has an impact on the utility ratio that
corresponds to x and y, if cardinal measures are introduced and ratios and differences are deﬁned.
20 AUCO Czech Economic Review, vol. 4, no. 1Machiavelli’s Possibility Hypothesis
restriction when it comes to voting. Another case is given by felon disenfranchisement.
In the State of Iowa almost 35 percent of its African-American population are barred
from voting by felon disenfranchisement laws.6 “By Election Day 2004, the number
of disenfranchised felons had grown to 5.3 million, with another 600,000 effectively
stripped of the vote because they were jailed awaiting trial. Nationally, they made up
less than 3 percent of the voting-age population, but 9 percent in Florida, 8 percent in
Delaware, and 7 percent in Alabama, Mississippi, and Virginia.” (DeParle 2007, p. 35)
It seems fair to conjecture that most of these people have preferences that deviate,
perhaps substantially, from the preferences of the average US voter. However, whether
this restriction of domain stabilizes the U.S. democracy seems questionable, at least in
the long run. But, to some extent, it bridges the gorge formalized in Arrow’s theory
because it homogenizes the preference proﬁle of the society when it comes to voting.
A less rigorous device of harmonizing preferences is education. In the Discorsi,
Machiavelli repeatedly pointed out that the functioning of the Roman republic strongly
depended on the education of the youth in accordance to widely shared values, in-
cluding a religion, that were decisive for the success of the community. In ancient
Greece, the education of the youth was considered an effective instrument to infuse
standards of moral behavior in accordance to the existing social norms. Education
supplemented the political institutions. Since the social norms and the political insti-
tutions varied substantially among the various city-states—think about Sparta, on the
one hand, and Athens, on the other—the education differed as well. (For details, see
Bitros and Karayiannis 2010.)
Adam Smith brings forward two major arguments why the public should be inte-
rested in the education of the ‘common people’. The ﬁrst argument is to support or to
maintain the martial spirit ‘of the great body of the people’, which is necessary to de-
fend the country and assure the security of its citizens. But education is also necessary
to increase the peoples’ power of judgment and resistance against “...the delusions
of enthusiasm and superstition, which among ignorant nations, frequently occasion
the most dreadful disorder. An instructed and intelligent people besides are always
more decent and orderly than an ignorant and stupid one” (Smith 1979 [1776/77],
p. 788). This sounds like harmonization by education and insight. However, Smith
also acknowledges that citizens develop a more critical view on politics and the politi-
cians. “In free countries, where the safety of government depends very much upon the
favourable judgment which the people may form of its conduct, it must surely be of
the highest importance that they should not be disposed to judge rashly or capriciously
concerning it.” (Smith 1979 [1776/77], p. 788) Perhaps in order to comfort the gov-
erning elite, Smith adds, “... due to education, citizens are more disposed to examine,
and more capable of seeing through, the interested complaints of faction and sedition,
and they are, upon that account, less apt to be misled into any wanton or unnecessary
opposition to the measures of government.” Here the government could be interpreted
6 In his review, DeParle (2007) refers to Jeff Manza and Christopher Uggen (2006), Locked Out: Felon
Disenfranchisement and American Democracy, Oxford University Press, p. 248–253, as source. “Disen-
franchised felon is a term that encompasses three groups. Some 27 percent are still behind bars. Others, 34
percent, are on probation or parole. And the larger share, 39 percent, are ‘ex-felons’ whise sentences have
been served.” (DeParle, 2007, p. 35)
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as the ‘shadow’ of a social welfare function that satisﬁes only one of Arrow’s axioms
and conditions: non-dictatorship.
“Aristotle must be turning in his grave. The theory of democracy can never be the
same (actually, it never was!) since Arrow,” Paul Samuelson (1972) commented when
Arrow was given the Nobel Prize in economics (which in fact is not a Nobel Prize!).
Perhaps one should emphasize the “actually, it never was!” William Riker proposes the
view that democracy is a set of rules which allows the substitution of one governing
elite by another—by means of majority voting. Partly, this is an adequate description
of the governmental system of ‘his America’, partly it is his suggestion to get around
the aggregation problems hiding in what he calls populism.
InhisDiscorsi, Machiavelli describes howthemajortwoparties, thearistocratsand
the plebeians, governed the Roman Republic by compromise that resulted from exten-
sive, explicit or implicit, bargaining. As described by Machiavelli, after Titus Livius,
“... under their republican constitution,” the Romans “had one assembly controlled by
the nobility, another by the common people, with the consent of each being required
for any proposal to become law. Each group admittedly tended to produce proposals
designed merely to further its own interests. But each was prevented by the other from
imposing its own interests on the law making. The result was that only such proposals
as favoured no faction could ever hope to succeed. The laws relating to the constitution
thus served to ensure that the common good was promoted at all times.”7 However,
third parties were excluded and so was the larger share of the population: women and
slaves.
Thus, in both the taking-turns of U.S. democracy and the compromise model of
the Roman Republic representation is limited and the sets of relevant preferences seem
to be rather constrained. But both systems worked quite efﬁciently if we take the
international success of the corresponding regime as measure rod. Considering world
power, the two regimes were even quite often compared to each other. However, both
regimes were installed in pre-existing order: the one was colonial while the other traces
back to the will of a principe nuovo (i.e., a tyrant hero). Therefore, neither the U.S. nor
the Roman Republic model can tell us how order emerges from a world of chaos and
common standards prevail that restrict the domain.
There is a growing literature that explains the emergence of common standards as a
result of an evolutionary process. For example, in two volumes Binmore (1994, 1998)
analyzes the condition for the evolution of social norms, more speciﬁcally, of justice. It
has to be said that to Binmore justice and moral behaviour are a means of co-ordination
only: “Just as it is actually within our power to move a bishop like a knight when
playing Chess, so we can steal, defraud, break promises, tell lies, jump lines, talk too
much, or eat peas with our knives when playing a morality game. But rational folk
choose not to cheat for much the same reason that they obey trafﬁc signals.” (Binmore
1998, p. 6) Binmore’s analysis shows substantial game theoretical skill, but it also
makes clear that a homogeneous society is just an evolutionary possibility and not a
necessary consequence. There is hope, but most likely more than one set of norms will
7 This is how Skinner (1984, p. 246) summarizes Machiavelli’s description of the law making institutions
of the Republic.
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develop and conﬂict seems unavoidable—if only substantiated as coordination failure.
Machiavelli proposes the principe nuovo who combines power and will to solve
the coordination problem in accordance with his preferences. To some extent, these
preferences can, by and large, be summarized as capturing power and defending it
against competitors. However, there is also the expected glory of the founder of a state
which seems to add to the power motivation. To qualify for this glory the principe
nuovo has to stabilize what he has created. This is where social efﬁciency and the
republic enter the scene.
3. The principe nuovo
Romulus, mythic founder of Rome, killed his brother Remus in order to avoid shar-
ing power. He also “... consented to the death of Titus Tatius, who had been elected
to share the royal authority with him” (Discourses, p. 120). In Machiavelli’s inter-
pretation, these murders guaranteed that one (and only one) will deﬁne the common
good. It was the will of the prince, and the prince acted as an Arrovian dictator: if
his choices were consistent then the social choices were consistent as well. Here the
views of Machiavelli and Arrow converge “In the ideal dictatorship there is but one
will involved in choice.” (Arrow 1963, p. 2) Of course, it was not Arrow’s intention
to justify dictatorship, and Machiavelli hopes for a dictator only in the case of disorder
and chaos when life is ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’ as one of his ‘pupils’
suggested.8
Machiavelli admits that, given the example of Romulus, “... it might be concluded
that the citizens, according to the example of their prince, might, from ambition and
the desire to rule, destroy those who attempt to oppose their authority” (Discourses,
p. 120). However, “... this opinion would be correct, if we do not take into considera-
tion the object which Romulus had in view in committing that homicide. But we must
assume, as a general rule, that it never or rarely happens that a republic or monarchy
is well constituted, or its old institutions entirely reformed, unless it is done by only
one individual; it is even necessary that he whose mind has conceived such a consti-
tution should be alone in carrying it into effect. A sagacious legislator of a republic,
therefore, whose object is to promote the public good, and not his private interests,
and who prefers his country to his own successors, should concentrate all authority
in himself; and a wise mind will never censure any one for having employed any ex-
traordinary means for the purpose of establishing a kingdom or constituting a republic”
(Discourses, p. 120).
This concurs with Machiavelli’s notorious dictum ‘the end justiﬁes the means’.9
In the case of Romulus, Machiavelli concludes: “It is well that, when the act accuses
8 Of course, Thomas Hobbes’ ‘Leviathan’ has close similarities with Machiavelli’s Prince. The difference
is that Hobbes justiﬁes the unrestricted power of the Prince by a somewhat na¨ ıve idea of a social contract
while Machiavelli’s Prince has to ﬁght to capture and exercise power in order to survive and perhaps gain
glory.
9 This is the famous translation in the Mentor Edition of The Prince (Prince, 1952 ed., p. 94). The corre-
sponding lines in Detmold’s translation of 1882 are “... for actions of all man, especially those of princes,
are judged by the result where there is no other judge” (Prince, 1882 ed., p. 49). The latter translation is
perhaps less impressive. However, it clariﬁes that Machiavelli refers to an empirical observation and not to a
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him, the result should excuse him; and when the result is good, as in the case of Romu-
lus, it will always absolve him from blame. For he is to be reprehended who commits
violence for the purpose of destroying, and not he who employs it for beneﬁcent pur-
poses.” (Discourses, p. 120f)
However, in order to be successful, the Prince, different from Arrow’s dictator,
needs speciﬁc qualities. Machiavelli points out that “... a prince should seem to be
merciful, faithful, humane, religious, and upright, and should even be so in reality; but
he should have his mind so trained that, when occasion requires it, he may know how
to change to the opposite” (Prince, 1882 ed., p. 59). Not surprisingly, Machiavelli con-
cludes: “It is not necessary, however, for a prince to possess all the above-mentioned
qualities; but itisessential that he should at leastseem to have them. I willeven venture
to say, that to have and to practise them constantly is pernicious, but to seem to have
them is useful.” (Prince, 1882 ed., p. 58f) Machiavelli demonstrates that politicians are
obliged not to be good, or, as summarized by Walzer (1973, p. 164), “No one succeeds
in politics without getting his hands dirty,” quoting the Communist leader Hoederer in
Sartre’s play ‘dirty hands’.10 Hoederer confesses to his young admirer, and potential
murderer, Hugo: “I have dirty hands right up to the elbows. I’ve plunged them in ﬁlth
and blood. Do you think you can govern innocently?” (Walzer 1973, p. 161)
History’sstoryunfoldedandﬁnallytheRomanRepublicevolved. Machiavelligave
an (efﬁciency) argument as to why, in the end, the princely government is expected to
transform into a republican system if the governmental regime should stay stable over
time. In Chapter IX of the Discourses we can read: “... although one man alone
should organize a government, yet it will not endure long if the administration of it
remains on the shoulders of a single individual; it is well, then, to conﬁde this to the
charge of many, for thus it will be sustained by the many.”
But there is no guarantee that the will of the founding hero to do the public good
carries over to the successor. The creation of an appropriate law is one way to imple-
mentthepursuanceofthepublicgood. Consequently, Machiavelliproposes:“Lawgiver
should ... be sufﬁciently wise and virtuous not to leave this authority which he has
assumed either to his heirs or to any one else; for mankind, being more prone to evil
than to good, his successor might employ for evil purposes the power which he had
used only for good ends.” (Discourses, p. 121)
However, there are cases in which it is hard to believe that the principe nuovo used
his resources and basket of cruelties for beneﬁcent purposes. And there are cases in
which the principe nuovo exploited the law instead of giving strength to it. Machiavelli
reports that Cesare Borgia made use of his minister Messer Remirro de Orco to gain
power and to please the people. “When he [Cesare Borgia] took the Romagna, it
had previously been governed by weak rulers, who had rather despoiled their subjects
than governed them, and given them more cause for disunion than for union, so that
the province was a prey to robbery, assaults, and every kind of disorder. He, therefore,
judgeditnecessarytogivethemagoodgovernment inordertomakethempeacefuland
normative statement. Throughout this text The Prince is quoted from Detmold’s translation as well as from
the Mentor Edition. Choices are made after comparing the alternative translations.
10 Jean Paul Sartre’s ‘les mains sales’ (‘dirty hands’) had its ﬁrst night at Paris in 1948, arranged by Pierre
Valde who was assisted by Jean Cocteau.
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obedienttohisrule. ForthispurposeheappointedMesserRemirrodeOrco, acrueland
able man, to whom he gave the fullest authority. This man, in a short time, was highly
successful, whereupon the duke, not deeming such excessive authority expedient, lest
it should become hateful, appointed a civil court of justice in the centre of the province
under an excellent president, to which each city appointed its own advocate. And
as he knew that the hardness of the past had engendered some amount of hatred, in
order to purge the minds of the people and to win them over completely, he resolved
to show that if any cruelty had taken place it was not by his orders, but through the
harsh disposition of his minister. And having found the opportunity he had him cut in
half and placed one morning in the public square at Cesena with a piece of wood and
blood-stained knife by his side. The ferocity of this spectacle caused the people both
satisfaction and amazement.” (Prince, 1952 ed., p. 55)
Note that Cesare Borgia used the law and the camouﬂage of a legal procedure to
sacriﬁce his loyal minister. Still he was the model of principe nuovo to Machiavelli
and it was his case that inspired Machiavelli to write Il Principe. However, in the end,
fortuna was not friendly to Cesare. It was fortuna which brought about the early death
of Cesare Borgia’s papal father Alexander VI. Again, it was fortuna who blinded him
when he supported the election of Julius II as successor of his father. Instead of being
a supporter to his ambitious projects, Julius II turned out to be a rival to the power
himself.
It seems obvious that Machiavelli expected that the Borgia family would unite Italy
under their sword and poison and that the united Italy would transform into a republic,
had it become reality and matured like Rome did. It seems quite obvious from the ﬁnal
chapter in The Prince that Machiavelli wanted to talk the Medici into another attempt
to accomplish the project of an all-Italian state which is strong enough to guarantee
peace and order for its citizens—and to ﬁght foreign enemies. More than two hun-
dred years later and north of the Alps, one of the most explicit critics of Il Principe
and Machiavelli (see fn. 1), turned his principality into a major European power, and
thereby laid the foundation of a united Germany under the dominance of Prussia, follo-
wing a straightforward Machiavellian policy. He is called Frederick the Great despite
the fact that he did not try to enhance his glory by transforming his kingdom into a
republic. He therefore should be held responsible for the mischief that, later, the Reich
brought to Europe and to mankind.
4. From power to stability and efﬁciency
History tells us, and it is stated in the Discourses, that the transformation into a re-
public was not a peaceful event in the case of Rome. On the other hand, it is obvious
from Machiavelli’s political writings that he believed republics to be the most stable
of political institutions. The costs in taking them by force and to establish a princely
power are likely to be prohibitive, compared to the capture of power in a principality.
“... in republics there is greater life, greater hatred, and more desire for vengeance;
they do not and cannot cast aside the memory of their ancient liberty, so that the surest
way is either to lay them waste or reside in them” (Prince, 1952 ed., p. 47).
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Efﬁciency is an argument to reduce limitations and expand the domain: “... the
Roman republic, after the plebeians became entitled to the consulate, admitted all its
citizens to this dignity without distinction of age or birth. In truth, age never formed
a necessary qualiﬁcation for public ofﬁce; merit was the only consideration, whether
found in young or old men.... As regards birth, that point was conceded from ne-
cessity, and the same necessity that existed in Rome will be felt in every republic that
aims to achieve the same success as Rome; for men cannot be made to bear labor and
privations without the inducement of a corresponding reward, nor can they be deprived
of such hope of reward without danger.” (Discourse, p. 221) “And admitting that this
may be so with regard to birth, then the question of age is necessarily also disposed of;
for in electing a young man to an ofﬁce which demands the prudence of an old man,
it is necessary, if the election rests with the people, that he should have made himself
worthy of that distinction by some extraordinary action. And when a young man has
so much merit as to have distinguished himself by some notable action, it would be a
great loss for the state not to be able to avail of his talents and services; and that he
should have to wait until old age has robbed him of that vigor of mind and activity of
which the state might have the beneﬁt in his earlier age.” (Discourses, p. 222) How-
ever, Roman history can serve as a good example to illustrate that there is a trade-off
between efﬁciency through participation and consistency in representation. The rise of
Julius Caesar and the end of the republic looks like a necessary consequence of this
conﬂict if anarchism should not prevail.
Obviously, there is no conﬂict between efﬁciency and consistency in Arrow’s world
if dictatorship is the solution to the aggregation problem. The dictator will choose the
alternative that is the top element of his preference order, of course given feasibility.
This is a necessary condition for Pareto efﬁciency, irrespective of the preferences of
the other members of the society. Note that the other members can only improve if the
dictator cannot put his top-ranked element into reality. The efﬁciency that Machiavelli
is talking about has to do with growth—enlarging the possibility set of the society.
Machiavelli’s historical perspective implies a problem of dynamic optimization under
uncertainty and Pareto optimality does not (directly) apply.
5. Machiavelli’s Possibility Hypothesis
Machiavelli’s writings emphasize the dominance of the political sector over all other
areas of social life. Law, economy, religion, and art are only accessories, ready to be
exploited in the race for power. This perspective, of course, is based on Machiavelli’s
observation and his profound studies of history. It does not derive from a moral judge-
ment.
It could be argued that there is conﬂict between the progressive structure of the
Machiavelli program and the cyclical view which Machiavelli holds on history: there
is growth and prosperity followed by destruction, chaos and possible reconstruction;
princely government is followed by tyranny, revolution, oligarchy, again revolution,
popular state, and ﬁnally the republic which in the end collapses into anarchy waiting
for the prince or tyrant to reinstall order (see Discourses, p. 101). In his History of
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Florence we can read: “The general course of changes that occur in states is from
condition of order to one of disorder, and from the latter they pass again to one of
order. For as it is not the fate of mundane affairs to remain stationary, so when they
have attained their highest state of perfection, beyond which they cannot go, they of
necessity decline. And thus again, when they have descended to the lowest, and by
their disorders have reached the very depth of debasement, they must of necessity rise
again, inasmuch as they cannot go lower.” (History, p. 218)
Machiavelli concludes: “Such is the circle which all republics11 are destined to run
through. Seldom, however, do they come back to the original form of government,
which results from the fact that their duration is not sufﬁciently long to be able to un-
dergo these repeated changes and preserve their existence. But it may well happen that
a republic lacking strength and good counsel in its difﬁculties becomes subject after a
while to some neighbouring state, that is better organized than itself; and if such is not
the case, then they will be apt to revolve indeﬁnitely in the circle of revolutions.” (Dis-
courses, p. 101f) This quote indicates that the ‘circle’ is no ‘law of nature’ although
the image is borrowed from nature.12 There are substantial variations in the develop-
ment of the governmental system and there are no guarantees that the circle will close
again. Obviously, there is room for political action and constitutional design that has
a substantial impact on the course of the political affairs. For instance, Machiavelli
concludes that “... if Rome had not prolonged the magistracies and the military com-
mands, she might not so soon have attained the zenith of her power; but if she had
been slower in her conquests, she would have also preserved her liberties the longer”
(Discourses, p. 388). We see that, despite his cyclical view of the world, Machiavelli
considered political action and constitutional design as highly relevant for the course
of history and also for what happens today and tomorrow. However, the cyclical view
allows us to learn from history and apply what we learned today and in the future.
Machiavelli repeatedly suggests that his contemporaries should study the Romans and
learn from them. In fact, in can be said that he has written the Discorsi to serve mainly
this purpose. Also in The Prince he advises Lorenzo, the addressee of this very book,
that it will not be ‘very difﬁcult’ to gain power in Italy and to redeem the country of
the barbarous cruelty and insolence of the foreigners if he calls “... to mind the ac-
tions and lives of the men” that he gave him as examples: Moses, Cyrus, and Theseus
(Prince, 1952 ed., p. 125). “... as to exercise for the mind, the prince ought to read
history and study the actions of eminent men, see how they acted in warfare, examine
the uses of their victories and defeats in order to imitate the former and avoid the latter,
and above all, do as some men have done in the past, who have imitated some one,
11 The German translation is ‘die Regierungen aller Staaten’ (Machiavelli 1977, p. 15), i.e. ‘the governments
of all states’, which is perhaps more adequate than to address the republic only.
12 Kersting (2006, p. 61f) contains arguments that imply that Machiavelli relied much stronger on the circle
principle than we propose here. Human nature does not change. It wavers between selﬁsh creed and ruthless
ambition, on the one hand, and the potential to strive for the common good, on the other. Depending on the
state of the world, we ﬁnd that the one or the other inclination dominates in frequency and success. There is
also the possibility of the ‘uomo virtuoso’ who, supported by fortuna, will lead his people out of the lowlands
of anarchy and chaos. The result of this potential and the alternative inclinations is a cyclical up-and-down
which sees tyranny and free state as turning points but still contains enough leeway for the formative power
of virt` u and fortuna.
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who has been much praised and gloriﬁed, and have always kept his deeds and actions
before them, as they say Alexander the Great imitated Achilles, Cesar Alexander, and
Scipio Cyrus” (Prince, 1952 ed., p. 83).
6. The Machiavelli project
A central hypothesis of this paper is that the target of Machiavelli’s political writings
was the renaissance of the Roman Republic in 16th century Italy in the form of a united
national state. There are straightforward indicators of this agenda in The Prince. In
ﬁnalizing Chapter 26, Machiavelli directly addresses the governing Medici: “It is no
marvel that none of the before-mentioned Italians have done that which it is hoped
your illustrious house may do” (Prince, 1952 ed., p. 125). “May your illustrious house
therefore assume this task with that courage and those hopes which are inspired by
a just cause, so that under its banner our fatherland may be raised up ...” (Prince,
1952 ed., p. 107). However, a uniﬁcation of Italy under the umbrella of a ‘princely’
family is just the ﬁrst step in the Machiavelli program. As we shall see below, it was
meant to be part of an evolutionary process which, at some stage, could lead into a,
more or less, stable republican system.
Machiavelli dedicated the text of The Prince to Lorenzo the Magniﬁcent, Son of
Piero di Medici.13 This dedication has been interpreted as Machiavelli’s attempt to
gain the favour of one of the powerful Medici “... in the hope that they might in-
vite him back to public service” (Gauss 1952, p. 11). This interpretation seems to be
widely accepted and probably contains some truth, too. However, another interpreta-
tion is possible. In the context of his program, it can also be interpreted as an attempt
to initiate a second go at creating a united Italy under the rule of the Medici to gua-
rantee peace and order. In a letter to his friend Francesco Guicciardini, Machiavelli
suggested the Condottiere Giovanni de’Medici, the notorious della Bande Nere, as lib-
erator of Italy.14 However, this Giovanni was deadly wounded in a battle already in
1526. This was years after Machiavelli saw Cesare Borgia failing in his endeavours
to conquer substantial parts of Italy and to resist the claims and the power of the vas-
sals and followers of the French and Spanish Crown and of the German Emperor who
divided Italy like a fallen prey. Machiavelli maintained that, despite rather masterful
precautions, Cesare Borgia was defeated by fortuna. It was fortuna that brought about
the early death of Cesare Borgia’s papal father Alexander VI. Again, it was fortuna
who blinded him when he supported the election of Julius II as successor of his father.
Instead of being a supporter to his ambitious projects, Julius II turned out to be a rival
to the power himself.
The Machiavelli program becomes evident when we compare the Roman history
13 Lorenzo the Magniﬁcent is the grandson of the Lorenzo di Medici who died in 1492 and entered history
books as The Magniﬁcent. His grandson died 1519, too early to fulﬁl what Machiavelli hoped for. However
it is not evident that the ‘new’ Lorenzo ever had a chance to look at Machiavelli’s text (see Gauss, 1952,
p. 11).
14 Francesco Guicciardini later became the highest ofﬁcial at the papal court and even ﬁrst commander of
the army of the Pope. He remained a friend to Machiavelli till the latter died, but did often not support his
plans and ideas (see Zorn 1977, p. XXXVIIf. and LIX.)
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as interpreted in the Discourses with the facts which we learn about Cesare Borgia
as written down in The Prince. In both cases we have an extremely cruel beginning
in which the corresponding ‘heroes’ violate widely held norms of the ‘human race’.
It has been argued that Machiavelli’s choice of Cesare Borgia, also called the Duke,
to become the hero of The Prince, was a grave error from the standpoint of his later
reputation as: “Cesare had committed crimes on his way to power, and it might be
added that he had committed other crimes too.” (Gauss 1952, p. 12f) It seems that
Machiavelli had foreseen such a critique and writes in The Prince (Prince, 1952 ed.,
p. 57): “Reviewing thus all the actions of the Duke, I ﬁnd nothing to blame, on the
contrary I feel bound, as I have done, to hold him up as an example to be imitated by
all who by fortune and with the arms of others have risen to power.”
7. Conclusion
What can Machiavelli tell us? Italy is united. It is more bureaucratic than chaotic. No
dictator is needed. But, of course, the republic has to be on its guard. In the Discourses,
Machiavelli demonstrated that a republic can embody strong forces that lead to its
success but, at the same time, to its resolution into chaos. Then, Machiavelli’s message
is that it needs the strong and unbiased will of a dictator to bring about order. The
dictator tries to stabilize power and, to gain him the glory, will introduce institutions
that, in the end, prepare for the establishment of a republic.
For Machiavelli, the dictator has a historical function while for Arrow the dicta-
tor is a possible solution to a logical problem. The Possibility Theorem stands out as
highly signiﬁcant scientiﬁc result and it won its author a Nobel Prize. The fact that it
was often discussed as Impossibility Theorem, demonstrating that a democratic aggre-
gation of preferences does not always work the way it should, did not irritate too much
as democracy was by and large identiﬁed with the competition of political parties or
presidential candidates, and not with the aggregation of preferences.15 More recently,
there is a discussion about the political and ideological condition that Arrow faced
when he did is pioneering work.16 Whatever the background of Arrow’s Theorem is
it has helped to clarify problems of aggregating preferences. The message is that the
aggregation does not work if we choose Arrow’s ordinal scheme and ask the social
preference function to satisfy some reasonable properties. Our hypothesis is that this
was already understood by Machiavelli as we can derive from his Discorsi and, more
obviously, from Il Principe.
15 See Riker (1982) but also the public choice literature that refers to Downs (1957). Obviously, Downs was
inﬂuenced by Schumpeter (1950) who proposed the model of political competition. It should be noted that
already in his ‘Stability in Competition’, Hotelling (1929) discussed the median voter model.
16 In the ‘Acknowledgements’ of the ﬁrst edition of his book, and reprinted in the second, Arrow informs
the reader that his “... study was initiated” while he was “... on leave from the Cowles Commission as a
consultant to The RAND Corporation, which is engaged in research under contract with the United States
Air Force.” Amadae (2003, p. 10) claims that it “... is no exaggeration to say that virtually all the roads
to rational choice theory lead from RAND. This observation draws attention to its role as a quintessential
American Cold War institution, and in turn to the Cold War motives that underlay much of the impetus
propagating rational choice theory.” (See Hillinger 2008, Holler and Marciano 2010 and Mirowski 2002 for
a discussion of this argument.)
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